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NOTE
EMPLOYER'S DUTY TO BARGAIN WITH
RESPECT TO PARTIAL TERMINATION OF
BUSINESS: FIRST NATIONAL
MAINTENANCE CORP. v. NLRB
OLLOWING a dispute over the amount of a management fee, the
First National Maintenance Corporation cancelled its contract to
provide housekeeping services to a nursing home customer. As a
result, First National Maintenance discharged all thirty-five of its employ-
ees who were employed pursuant to the contract with the nursing home.'
Prior to the discharge, however, the employees' union requested a delay
from the employer for the purpose of bargaining. When the employer re-
fused to bargain, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the
National Labor Relations Board.2 The charge alleged that the employer
violated its duty to bargain in good faith "with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment ' 3 under sections 8(a)(5) 4
and 8(d)5 of the National Labor Relations Act. 6 The National Labor Re-
lations Board7 upheld the charge based upon a per se rule that required
bargaining over the decision to partially terminate a business. 8 The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit enforced the Board's order and held
that, while no per se rule could govern an employer's decision to terminate
part of its business, section 8(d) created a presumption of mandatory bar-
1. First National Maintenance's policy was to hire personnel separately for each cus-
tomer; it did not transfer employees between locations. The contract with the nursing home
prohibited the home from hiring any of First National Maintenance's employees during the
term of the contract and for ninety days thereafter.
2. An unfair labor practice is defined as any unfair labor practice listed in § 8 of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976).
3. Id. § 158(d).
4. Id. § 158(a)(5).
5. Id. § 158(d).
6. Id. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. I 1978) [hereinafter referred to as the Act].
7. The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 separated the prosecutorial and adjudicative functions
of the National Labor Relations Board [hereinafter referred to as the Board] and assigned
them to different branches of the agency. The General Counsel assumed the prosecutorial
function and the five-member Board (expanded from three) assumed the adjudicative func-
tion. See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 5 (1976). For a discussion of the Board's role in unfair labor practice cases and
representation cases, see A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 104-13 (9th ed. 1981).
8. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. 462, 463 (1979).
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gaining over such a decision.9 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari. Held, reversed: Although the employer is required to bargain
about the effects of its decision to terminate a contract with one of its com-
mercial customers purely for economic reasons, the employer has no duty
to bargain with the union as to the decision itself. First National Mainte-
nance Corp. v. NLRB, 101 S. Ct. 2573, 69 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1981).
I. MANDATORY BARGAINING
Since 1935 the National Labor Relations Act has accorded the rights of
unionization and collective bargaining to American workers. 1° The pur-
pose of the Act is to provide for peaceful settlement of labor disputes be-
tween companies and unions through collective negotiation." Once a
majority of eligible employees manifests a desire to form a labor organiza-
tion, 12 both the employer and the union representing the employees have a
duty to bargain collectively.' 3 Section 8(a)(5) of the Act provides that an
employer's refusal to bargain collectively with the union's representative
constitutes an unfair labor practice.' 4 Section 8(b)(3) places a correlative
bargaining obligation upon unions.' 5
Congress has defined the scope of mandatory bargaining in section 8(d)
as:
[Tihe performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and con-
fer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment . . .but such obligation does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a conces-
sion .... 16
9. NLRB v. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 627 F.2d 596, 601 (2d Cir. 1980).
10. Section 7 of the Act provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ...." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
11. Section 1 of the Act provides: "It is declared to be the policy of the United States to
eliminate the courses of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce.. . by
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining. . . for the purpose of ne-
gotiating the terms and conditions of [workers'] employment .. " 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
12. This is referred to as majority status. See R. GORMAN, supra note 7, at 105-07. The
most common way to manifest majority status is through a properly conducted Board elec-
tion. Id. at 40. Alternative ways to show majority status include authorization cards signed
by a majority of employees, a petition signed by a majority of employees, a head count
showing majority support, and an employer conducted poll. Id. at 105-07. These alterna-
tives may not be compelled by either party, whereas the election process may be compelled
if either party requests it. Id. at 40. The Act provides the procedure for union election. See
29 U.S.C. § 159(a)-(e) (1976).
13. See R. GORMAN, supra note 7, at 105-07.
14. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). Section 9(a) of the Act provides that the representa-
tives selected by the employees shall be the exclusive representatives for collective bargain-
ing. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
. 15. Section 8(b)(3) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organiza-
tion or its agents. . . to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is the
representative of his employees subject to the provisions of section [9(a)] ... " 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(3) (1976).
16. Id. § 158(d) (emphasis added).
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Because the duty to bargain does not extend to subjects that are not con-
sidered "terms and conditions" of the employment relationship, 17 the cru-
cial question becomes: What is a term or condition of employment? The
broad statutory language affords no answer; the Board has traditionally
determined on a case-by-case basis what subjects will require bargaining.' 8
The Board first addressed this question in the 1940 case of Singer Manu-
facturing Co. 19 and held that paid holidays, vacations, and bonuses are a
part of the wages and working conditions of employees, and as such, are a
necessary subject of collective bargaining.20 Since its decision in Singer,
the Board has designated numerous mandatory subjects of collective bar-
gaining 2' including work schedules, 22 insurance benefits, 23 pensions, 24 and
17. Bargaining subjects are classified as mandatory, permissive, or illegal. See NLRB v.
Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 01958); R. GORMAN, supra note 7, at
496-98. Mandatory subjects are those dealing with "wages, hours, and other terms and con-
ditions of employment" under § 8(d) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). See R.
GORMAN, supra note 7, at 498. The sole requirement is that the parties bargain in good faith
over mandatory subjects; neither § 8(a)(5) nor § 8(b)(3) of the Act legally obligates the par-
ties to yield. Id. For examples of mandatory subjects, see infra notes 21-25 and accompany-
ing text. Because nonmandatory subjects outside the employment relationship are
considered permissive subjects of bargaining, each party is free to bargain or not to bargain.
See R. GORMAN, supra note 7, at 498. A management decision having only an indirect
impact on the employment relationship would be considered a nonmandatory subject of
bargaining. Illegal subjects of bargaining are those unlawful or inconsistent with the poli-
cies of the Act. Id. at 529-3 1. An example of an illegal subject would be a racial discrimina-
tion clause in a contract. See Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1577 (1964); see also
Heinsz, The Partial-Closing Conundrum: The Duty ofEmployers and Unions to Bargain in
Good Faith, 1981 DuKE L.J. 71, 72 n.9.
18. Although the Act is silent with respect to the Board's authority to specify mandatory
subjects of bargaining, the Board has assumed this role since its creation. See Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 219 n.2 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring); General
Motors Corp., 191 N.L.R.B. 951, 953-54 (1971) (Fanning, & Brown, J.J., dissenting), en-
forced sub nom. UAW Local 864 v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The argument
could be made that by adopting a general phrase as part of § 8(d), Congress intended to
preserve future interpretation by the Board. See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,
101 S. Ct. 2573, 2579 n.14, 69 L. Ed. 2d 318, 329 n.14 (1981).
19. 24 N.L.R.B. 444 (1940), modified on other grounds and enforced, 119 F.2d 131 (7th
Cir. 1941).
20. 24 N.L.R.B. at 470.
21. The Board relied on §§ 8(a)(5) and 9(a) of the Act, because these were the only
statutory provisions concerning subjects of collective bargaining. Later, Congress enacted
§ 8(d), which added "terms" of employment to the "wages, hours of employment, and other
conditions of employment" previously set forth in § 9(a) of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1976). For an extensive list of subjects over which employers and unions are currently
required to bargain, see Heinsz, supra note 17, at 72.
22. Inter-City Advertising Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 1377, 1384 (1945) (ordering the employer to
bargain collectively with union when employer unilaterally changed working schedules),
enforcement denied on other grounds, 154 F.2d 244 (4th Cir. 1946); Wilson & Co., 19
N.L.R.B. 990, 999 (ordering company to bargain with union when company changed work
schedules without prior consultation with or notice to union), enforced, 115 F.2d 759 (8th
Cir. 1940).
23. General Motors Corp., 81 N.L.R.B. 779, 791 (1949) (by its unilateral action regard-
ing group insurance program, employer had refused to bargain collectively), enforced, 179
F.d 221 (2d Cir. 1950); W.W. Cross & Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1162, 1164 (1948) (employer was
under statutory duty to bargain collectively with union concerning terms of a group health
and accident insurance plan), enforced, 174 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949).
24. Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1, 13 (employer was under statutory duty to bargain
collectively with union concerning terms of pension and retirement program), enforced, 170
F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949).
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subcontracting. 25 Once an aspect of the employment relationship is found
to be a mandatory subject of bargaining, either party can force the other to
bargain about that subject. 26 Although the Act does not obligate the par-
ties to come to an agreement, a mandatory bargaining process allows the
parties to consider all the alternatives available to them before an irrevoca-
ble decision is made.27
While the Board and the courts of appeals have agreed with respect to
many bargaining subjects, they have manifested widely divergent ap-
proaches toward the subject of partial termination of an employer's busi-
ness.28 The Board has generally required an employer who is considering
closing a part of his business to notify and bargain with a union over both
the decision and effects of a partial termination. 29 The appellate courts,
however, have held that the obligation to bargain concerning a partial
closing extends only to the effects of the closing, because the initial deci-
sion to terminate part of a business is a prerogative of management. 30
The conflicting interpretations by the Board and the courts of two
25. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500, 518 (1946) (employer has duty to sit
down and discuss matter of subcontracting work with union when requested to do so), en-
forcement denied on other grounds, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947).
26. See R. GORMAN, supra note 7, at 496-98.
27. The Board has noted that bargaining will not restrain or obligate the employer to
yield to a union's demand, but will lead to a candid discussion of the problems that face
labor and management together. Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1027,
enforced, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963). As a result the parties will frequently resolve their
mutual problems to the satisfaction of each. During bargaining, business operations may be
continued profitably and jobs safeguarded. Id. For an example of concessions made in the
bargaining process, see infra note 82.
28. For a discussion of the duty to bargain over partial termination decisions, see gener-
ally Goetz, The Duty to Bargain About Changes in Operations, 1964 DUKE L.J. 1; Heinsz,
supra note 18; Murphy, Plant Relocation and the Collective-Bargaining Obligation, 59 N.C.L.
REV. 5 (1980); Rabin, Fibreboard and the Termination of Bargaining Unit Work.: The Search
for Standards in Defining the Scope of the Duty to Bargain, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 803 (1971);
Schwarz, Plant Relocation or Partial Termination-The Duty to Decision-Bargain, 39 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 81 (1970); Case Comment, Duty to Bargain About Termination of Operations.-
Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 92 HARV. L. REV. 768 (1979).
29. "Effects" bargaining involves the rights of employees that arise only as a conse-
quence of a business termination. Severence pay, pensions, seniority, and possible reem-
ployment in other parts of the employer's business are examples of these rights. See infra
text accompanying notes 44-47 & 53.
30. See Royal Typewriter Co. v. NLRB, 533 F.2d 1030, 1039 (8th Cir. 1976) (although
no duty to bargain regarding employer's decision to close a plant, duty exists to bargain with
union in good faith over areas affected by decision); Morrison Cafeterias Consol. v. NLRB,
431 F.2d 254, 257 (8th Cir. 1970) (employer not obligated to bargain with union with respect
to its decision to close cafeteria, but employer required to bargain with respect to effects of
permanent closing); see also NLRB v. Drapery Mfg. Co., 425 F.2d 1026, 1028 (8th Cir. 1970)
(no duty to bargain because drapery work shut down as result of economic losses); NLRB v.
Thompson Transp. Co., 406 F.2d 698, 703 (10th Cir. 1969) (no duty to bargain because
terminal closed for economic reasons); NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d
933, 940 (9th Cir. 1967) (duty to bargain over effects of shut down but not decision to shut
down); NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1965) (no duty to
bargain over managerial decision to close plant).
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Supreme Court decisions, Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB3' and
Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing Co.,32 illustrate the
different approaches taken with respect to an employer's duty to bargain in
partial termination situations. In Fibreboard the company announced dur-
ing the renegotiation of a collective bargaining agreement that substantial
savings could be realized if the company subcontracted out all mainte-
nance work performed by its employees. The company hired an in-
dependent contractor who, using the same equipment and supervisors,
performed the maintenance work in the plant previously done by former
employees. The Board found that the company's failure to negotiate with
the union concerning its decision to contract out maintenance work vio-
lated section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 33
Affirming the Board's decision, the Supreme Court in Fibreboard held
that: (1) the Act's mandatory language concerning a "condition of em-
ployment" clearly covers a job termination decision; (2) mandatory bar-
gaining over subcontracting promotes industrial peace; and (3) collective
bargaining agreements commonly contain subcontracting provisions as ev-
idenced by industrial practice.34 Statements indicating that the Court
based its decision solely on the particular facts of the case, however, lim-
ited the expansive language in the opinion.35 Furthermore, the Court
pointed out that the company's decision to subcontract its maintenance
work did not involve a major capital investment or a change in the com-
pany's basic operation.3 6 In a concurring opinion Justice Stewart agreed
that Fibreboard should be limited to its facts, and he interpreted the major-
31. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
32. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
33. 138 N.L.R.B. 550, 551 (1962), enforced sub nom. Machinists Local 1304 v. NLRB,
322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), a]/'d, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). The Board based its ruling on the
doctrine established in Town & Country Mfg. Co.: contracting-out is a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining. 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1027-28 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir.
1963). In Town & Country the Board relied primarily on Order of R.R. Telegraphers v.
Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960). 136 N.L.R.B. at 1027-28. Although the Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163, 181-188 (1976), governed Telegraphers, the Railway Labor
Act contains bargaining provisions similar to those in the National Labor Relations Act. In
Telegraphers the union requested bargaining over a contract provision that would have re-
quired union consent before any employment position could be terminated. The Supreme
Court held that the provision related to the employees' "conditions of employment" and
was, therefore, a proper subject for mandatory collective bargaining. 362 U.S. at 336. Be-
cause the National Labor Relations Act requires similar bargaining over the "terms and
conditions of employment," the Board in Town & Country held that the economically based
decision to eliminate jobs through subcontracting was a mandatory subject of bargaining.
136 N.L.R.B. at 1026-28. Telegraphers, however, is distinguished in NLRB v. Adams Dairy,
Inc., 322 F.2d 553, 562 (8th Cir. 1963) (Telegraphers involved the Railway Labor Act and
the decision to terminate affected employees left in the bargaining union), vacated, 379 U.S.
644, on remand, 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966). See Goetz,
supra note 28, at 12; Heinsz, supra note 17, at 75 n.38. Because the majority in First Nat'l
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB barely considered Telegraphers and relegated it to a footnote
discussion, the Supreme Court may have implicitly adopted the Adams Dairy distinction.
See 101 S. Ct. at 2584 n.23, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 336 n.23.
34. Fibreboard Paper Prods., Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 210-12 (1964).
35. Id. at 215.
36. Id. at 213.
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ity opinion as a refusal to impose upon employers a mandatory duty to
bargain over "managerial decisions, which lie at the core of en-
trepreneurial control."'37
Unlike Fibreboard, which involved an employer's duty under section
8(a)(5) to bargain collectively with the representative of its employees,
Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing Co.38 arose under sec-
tion 8(a)(3)'s provision that an employer's encouragement or discourage-
ment of membership in a labor union is an unfair labor practice. 39 When
the union campaigned to organize the employees at one of the employer's
plants, the company strenuously resisted the organizational efforts and
threatened to close the mill. After the workers voted to unionize, the com-
pany closed the plant and sold the equipment. The Board found that the
company violated the Act by closing part of its business for discriminatory
or antiunion purposes. 40 The Supreme Court remanded the case to the
court of appeals, but held that while an employer had an absolute right to
close its entire business for any reason, including antiunion considera-
tions,4' partial closings for discriminatory reasons violated the Act.
42
Following Darlington's broad language about an employer's right to
partially close his business for any reason but antiunionism, several appel-
late courts have narrowed the application of Fibreboard.43 Moreover, the
appellate courts have also seized upon Fibreboard's limiting language to
distinguish it from other partial termination cases.44 In contrast, the Board
has focused upon the broad language in Fibreboard and has determined
that certain management decisions involving changes in the business oper-
ations require mandatory bargaining. In Ozark Trailers, Inc.45 the Board
reemphasized its basic policy requiring employers to bargain over partial
termination decisions and criticized the strict approach taken by several
courts of appeals in applying Fibreboard to partial closings other than sub-
contracting. 46 In Ozark Trailer the employer closed a part of its manufac-
37. Id. at 223.
38. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). Although § 8(a)(5) was not the issue in Darlington,
that decision had a profound influence on an employer's duty to bargain in partial closing
situations. See infra text accompanying note 59.
40. Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241, 246-47 (1962), enforcement denied, 325 F.2d
682 (4th Cir. 1963).
41. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 273-74 (1965).
42. Id. at 274-76. The -Court found a partial closing to be subject to § 8(a)(3)'s bar
against union discrimination because, if motivated by antiunion objectives, the closing can
serve to discourage employees from unionizing in the employer's other plants. Id. at 275.
43. The courts have found that where a termination is based solely on economic rea-
sons, and not antiunion reasons, there is no obligation to bargain under § 8(a)(5). Unlike
subcontracting, these partial closing decisions are at the "core of entrepreneurial control."
See, e.g., NLRB v. Thompson Transp. Co., 406 F.2d 698, 703 (10th Cir. 1969); NLRB v.
William J. Bums Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 346 F.2d 897, 902 (8th Cir. 1965); see also
NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 195-96 (3d Cir. 1965); NLRB v.
Adams Dairy, Inc., 322 F.2d 553, 556 (8th Cir. 1963), vacated, 379 U.S. 644, on remand, 350
F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966).
44. See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
45. 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966).
46. Id. at 566-67.
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turing operations without notifying or consulting the union. The Board
found a violation of section 8(a)(5). 47 The Board rested its opinion solely
on Fibreboard and held that Darlington did not apply to section 8(a)(5)
duty-to-bargain cases. 48
The Board has not been entirely consistent with its per se approach that
requires employers to bargain over partial termination decisions. In Gen-
eral Motors Corp.49 the Board retreated from its holding in Ozark Trailers
that an employer has a duty to bargain about partial closing decisions.50
General Motors involved an economically motivated decision to sell an
independent dealership. When the union heard of the possible sale, it re-
quested, unsuccessfully, that management negotiate prior to any decision
to sell. The Board noted first the number of appellate court decisions that
had rejected its per se approach in partial termination cases. 51 Without
specifically overruling Ozark Trailers, the Board determined that because
the decision to sell was "essentially financial and managerial in nature...
[lying] at the very core of entrepreneurial control," 52 the employer was
under no duty to bargain. 53 Three years later, in Royal Typewriter Co .,54
the Board followed its original position in Ozark Trailers, which required
mandatory bargaining.55 Finding that in Royal Typewriter the company
closed one of its plants, but continued to manufacture similar products at
another plant, the Board distinguished General Motors factually.56 In
Brockway Motor Trucks,57 however, the Board once again retreated from
Ozark Trailers. The company decided to close one of its plants that manu-
factured, distributed, and repaired trucks. The Board reiterated its basic
policy, but noted that the company had not proved that its decision in-
volved a "significant investment or withdrawal of capital" as to "affect the
scope and ultimate direction of the enterprise."58
47. Id. at 564.
48. Id. at 565.
49. 191 N.L.R.B. 951 (1971), enforced sub nom. United Auto., Aerospace & Agricul-
tural Implement Workers Local 864 v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
50. The majority opinion in General Motors acknowledged that the courts have ac-
cepted the Board's position in subcontracting cases, but have rejected the Board's position in
cases involving management decisions such as plant closings and plant relocations. 191
N.L.R.B. at 951.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 952.
53. Id. The dissenting members of the Board contended that the majority relied prima-
rily on Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Fibreboard and the decisions of several courts
of appeals that had rejected Board decisions applying Fibreboard. Id. at 953. The dissent
further argued that the concurrence in Fibreboard and the dictum with respect to managerial
decisions were not the law of the case. Id. They would have followed the Board's approach
as set out in Ozark Trailers. Id.
54. 209 N.L.R.B. 1006 (1974).
55. 1d. at 1012.
56. Id.
57. 230 N.L.R.B. 1002 (1977), enforcement denied withoutprejudice to commencement of
additionalproceedings, 582 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1978), on remand, 251 N.L.R.B. 29 (1980).
58. 230 N.L.R.B. at 1003. The Board implied that if the closing had involved a major
financial reinvestment or a major change in the company's operation, there might have been
no duty to bargain. But see Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 528 F.2d 720, 724 n.7 (3d
Cir. 1978), on remand, 251 N.L.R.B. 29 (1980).
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The appellate courts generally have rejected Board attempts to extend
decision bargaining to operational changes other than factual situations
nearly identical to Fibreboard. Five circuits have plainly indicated that
they will not extend the limited facts of Fibreboard to establish a
mandatory duty to bargain. The courts, however, have continued to up-
hold the well-established principle that an employer has a duty to bargain
over the effects of the partial termination decision but not the decision
itself. The Eighth Circuit has consistently refused to adopt the Board's
view and has held that absent discrimination, management has no duty to
bargain with a union over the decision to partially close its business. 59 Ac-
cording to the court, this decision involves a major change in the operation
of the company and is inherently a management prerogative.60 The
Third,61 Sixth,62 Ninth,63 and Tenth" Circuits have also limited
Fibreboard to its facts.65 According to these courts, if the decision repre-
sents a change in the direction of the business, mandatory bargaining
would conflict with management rights. Only the Fifth Circuit, 66 and per-
haps the D.C. Circuit67 and the Second Circuit,68 have been receptive to
the Board's post-Fibreboard decisions. 69 On the whole the recent cases
demonstrate that the Board and the courts have been moving in opposite
59. See Royal Typewriter Co. v. NLRB, 533 F.2d 1030, 1039 (8th Cir. 1976); Morrison
Cafeterias Consol., Inc. v. NLRB, 431 F.2d 254, 257 (8th Cir. 1970).
60. NLRB v. Drapery Mfg. Co., 425 F.2d 1026, 1028 (8th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Adams
Dairy, Inc., 322 F.2d 533, 559 (8th Cir. 1963), vacated, 379 U.S. 644, on remand, 350 F.2d
108, 111 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966). The appellate court held that the
dairy's decision to terminate that part of its business handling distribution of milk products
and to distribute its products through independent contractors was not a mandatory subject
of bargaining. 322 F.2d at 562.
61. NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965) (no obligation
to bargain when partial closing decision involved a major change in the direction of the
company).
62. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Prods., Inc., 439 F.2d 40, 42 (6th Cir. 1971) (no obligation to
bargain over decision to move work of one unit to another unit).
63. NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933, 939 (9th Cir. 1967) (no obli-
gation to bargain over decision to move shipbuilding facilities to new location when em-
ployer faced with inability to serve its primary customer).
64. NLRB v. Thompson Transp. Co. 406 F.2d 698, 703 (10th Cir. 1969) (no obligation
to bargain over termination of part of business when employer had lost substantial part of its
business and relocation involved major corporate change).
65. See Heinsz, supra note 17, at 81-82 & n.74.
66. NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 361 F.2d 512, 517 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
935 (1966) (decision to discontinue cheese cutting and packing at employer's warehouse
found to be mandatory subject of bargaining); see also NLRB v. W.R. Grace & Co., 571
F.2d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1978) (decision to discontinue part of production process found to be
mandatory subject of bargaining); NLRB v. American Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 74, 80 (5th Cir.
1965) (decision to subcontract work previously done by employees found to be mandatory
subject of bargaining).
67. International Ladies Garment Workers v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 907, 916 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (economic decision involving relocation but no major change in scope of enterprise is
mandatory subject of bargaining).
68. NLRB v. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 627 F.2d 596, 601-02 (2d Cir. 1980) (rebut-
table presumption of the duty to bargain in partial closing context), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 2573, 69
L. Ed. 2d 318 (1981).
69. See Heinsz, supra note 17, at 81 n.74.
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directions, which undoubtedly confuses companies, unions, and employees
alike.
II. FIRST NATIONAL MAINTENANCE CORP. v NLRB
In First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB 70 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the question of whether an economically motivated decision to
close part of a business is a mandatory subject of bargaining. The Court
held that the employer has no legal duty to bargain with the union over the
decision itself to partially terminate a business, but that the employer must
bargain over the effects of such a decision.7 1
The Court, in its analysis, first defined the scope of mandatory subjects
of bargaining.7 2 Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun identified
three distinct types of management decisions: (1) those that have only an
"indirect and attenuated impact on the employment relationship";
(2) those that "are almost exclusively" a part of the employment relation-
ship; and (3) those that have a direct impact on employment, but focus
only on economic profitability, a concern distinct from the employment
relationship.73 The Court found the management decision in First Na-
tional Maintenance to be the third type, and promulgated a balancing test
to deal with that type of management decision. The court determined that:
In view of an employer's need for unencumbered decisionmaking,
bargaining over management decisions that have a substantial impact
on the continued availability of employment should be required only
if the benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective bar-
gaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the
business. 74
Thus, the Court concluded that the union's benefit resulting from its par-
ticipation in the decisionmaking did not outweigh the burden to the em-
ployer's business decisions based on economic factors.75 Therefore, the
70. 101 S. Ct. 2573, 69 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1981).
71. Id. at 2582, 2584, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 332, 335-36.
72. For a discussion of the Board's broad leeway in defining mandatory bargaining
subjects, see supra note 18.
73. 101 S. Ct. at 2579-80, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 329.
74. Id. at 2581, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 331. Although the Supreme Court had not previously
formulated a balancing test regarding decisions to close, the Third Circuit in Brockway Mo-
tor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1978), had already expressed a similar balancing
test. The Brockway court began its analysis with the premise that decisions to close should
be mandatory subjects of bargaining absent other considerations. Id. at 734-35. The court
relied on Fibreboard's interpretation of the Act's general policy favoring bargaining and on
Fibreboard's discussion of the literal meaning of § 8(d). Id. at 735 (citing Fibreboard Paper
Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1964)). The court in Brockway, however,
employed a three-part test weighing (1) the employees' interest in changing management's
decision; (2) the likelihood that bargaining would cause the employer to change its decision;
and (3) the management's interest in not bargaining. 582 F.2d at 735-39. This analysis
assumes that in a number of potential shutdown cases the union will be able to make a
useful contribution to the decisionmaking process by agreeing to concessions in exchange for
continuance of operations. Concessions would primarily include the union's ability to ac-
cept wage reductions and a genuine promise of restraint when requesting future raises. See
Case Comment, supra note 28, at 777-78.
75. 101 S. Ct. at 2584, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 335.
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decision to partially close was not within the scope of "terms and condi-
tions" subject to mandatory bargaining.76
In formulating this new test, the Supreme Court rejected both the
Board's per se rule requiring mandatory bargaining 77 and the Second Cir-
cuit's presumption of mandatory bargaining.78 The Supreme Court deter-
mined that the presumption analysis adopted by the court of appeals was
inappropriate to advance harmonious relations between employer and em-
ployee. 79 The Court noted, for example, that an employer could not easily
predict the degree of bargaining required when a decision involved eco-
nomic necessity.80 The Court apparently intended to counter the uncer-
tainty concerning the bargaining requirement for partial closings by
weighing the employer's need for free decisionmaking against the union's
need for participation in the decisionmaking in each particular case.
The Court seemingly distinguished Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v.
NLRB by disposing of the three factors relied upon in Fibreboard to indi-
cate the subject's amenability to the bargaining process. 81 The Court used
the new benefit-burden test to dispose of the first two factors in Fibreboard
the literal language of the Act and the promotion of industrial peace. Res-
olution of the Court's benefit-burden test will determine whether the job
determination decision is actually a "condition of employment" and there-
fore a mandatory subject of bargaining. Similarly, the outcome of the test
in each instance is designed to promote industrial peace. The problem the
Court confronted, however, was the third criterion set forth in Fibreboard:
prevailing industrial practice. The court recognized that in situations
where businesses have become unprofitable bargaining has produced con-
cessions from unions whose members might consider sacrificing benefits to
insure continued employment.82 The Court concluded, however, that bar-
gaining over the effects of the decision could produce the same concessions
as bargaining over the decision itself.83
The Court found basic support for its newly formulated balancing test
by noting that Fibreboard engaged in a balancing analysis. 84 In its appli-
cation of the test the Court identified the strong conflicting interests of the
employer and employees in the decision to effect a partial closing. On the
employer's side, the Court recognized that management may need to act
quickly and secretly in order to capitalize on business opportunities.85 Ad-
76. Id., 69 L. Ed. 2d at 335-36.
77. See supra text accompanying note 8.
78. See supra text accompanying note 9.
79. 101 S. Ct. at 2583, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 334.
80. Id.
81. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1964); see supra text
accompanying note 34.
82. 101 S. Ct. at 2582 n.19, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 332 n.19. The Court acknowledged that in
the past unions have helped employers save declining businesses by accepting wage and
benefit reductions, agreeing to increase production, and lending earned wages to the busi-
ness. Id.
83. Id at 2582, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 332.
84. Id at 2581, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 331.
85. Id at 2582, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 333.
[Vol. 36
ditionally, the Court recognized that the employer may be forced to close
part of its business, 86 and bargaining would therefore be futile.87 More-
over, the Court expressed concern that if it labeled this type of decision a
mandatory subject of bargaining, then a union could thwart an employer's
business goals.88 Finally, the Court observed that current industry practice
supported its decision, because restrictions on management are relatively
rare in subcontracting or replacement provisions of collective bargaining
agreements.8 9
Turning its attention to the union, the Court emphasized that a union
would have significant input under its right to engage in effects bargain-
ing.90 The Court pointed out that in contract negotiations a union could
secure provisions that entitled the union to "notice, information, and fair
bargaining." 9' The Court added that a union would always have section
8(a)(3) protection against partial closings motivated by antiunion senti-
ment.92 Finally, the Court concluded that a union would have some con-
trol over the effects of the decision and would have sufficient opportunity
to insure that the decision itself would be deliberately considered.93
In a dissenting opinion Justice Brennan argued that the Court's balanc-
ing test considered only the interests of management. 94 Justice Brennan
contended that this case, like Fibreboard, literally involved terms and con-
ditions of employment and concerned matters crucial to employees.95
Moreover, he criticized the application of the Court's balancing test as be-
ing speculative and failing to take into account possible concessions a
union would be able to offer as a result of decision bargaining. 96 The dis-
sent also criticized the Court's presumption that management's need for
flexibility in making partial closing decisions would be frustrated by a re-
86. Id at 2583, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 333.
87. Id
88. Id, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 334 (citing Comment, "Partial Terminations'"--A Choice Between
Bargaining Equality and Economic Efficiency, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1089, 1103-05 (1967)).
89. 101 S. Ct. at 2583, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 334.
90. Id at 2582, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 333.
91. Id
92. Id Under § 8(a)(3) the Board may inquire into the motives behind a partial clos-
ing. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
93. 101 S. Ct. at 2582, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 333.
94. Id at 2586, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 337.
95. Id at 2585-86, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 337. Justice Brennan also referred to Ozark Trailers,
Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966), as support for this proposition. 101 S. Ct. at 2586, 69 L. Ed.
2d at 337.
96. 101 S. Ct. at 2586, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 338. The dissent noted, as an example, the
negotiations between Chrysler Corporation and the United Auto Workers, which led to ma-
jor adjustments in compensation and benefits, and allowed Chrysler to remain in business.
Id The dissent maintained that when employees have the opportunity to offer concessions,
they can often enable the company to continue its business operations. Id The only clear
difference between the dissent and the majority positions as to this important question of
concessions is that the majority believes the union and company can arrive at these conces-
sions through "effects" bargaining "conducted in a meaningful manner and at a meaningful
time." Id at 2582, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 332. A "meaningful time" would seem to require bar-
gaining before an irrevocable decision was made, and therefore decision bargaining would
be unnecessary.
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quirement to bargain. 97 Finally, the dissent objected to the Court's refusal
to defer to the Board's authority and expertise in such matters.98
While the Court's benefit-burden language and its reasoning99 appear to
make First National Maintenance an extremely broad holding, 100 the ma-
jority expressly limited its holding by turning to the specific facts of the
case. First, the Court noted that the employer had no intention of replac-
ing the discharged employees or of moving that operation elsewhere; the
employer's sole purpose was to reduce its economic loss. 101 Thus the
Court left other types of management decisions, including plant reloca-
tions, sales, automation, and other kinds of subcontracting, for considera-
tion on their particular facts. 102 The Court further restricted the holding
by implying that mandatory bargaining would be futile where the em-
ployer's dispute concerned only the size of the management fee, a factor
over which the union had no authority or control.10 3 Noting that labor
costs were the basis for the decision to subcontract in Fibreboard, the
Court distinguished the subcontracting issue in Fibreboard from the con-
tract cancellation issue in First National Maintenance.' 4 Thus, it is un-
clear whether First National Maintenance is limited solely to partial
closings based upon nonlabor costs.' 0 5 Finally, the Court noted that the
employer's purpose in cancelling the contract was not to defy ongoing ne-
gotiations or the existing collective bargaining agreement, because the
maintenance company's economic difficulties began before the union was
selected as the bargaining representative.0 6 This limitation implies that
the result in First National Maintenance may not be extended to situations
when the union has been selected before economic difficulties arise.10 7
Although the factual limitations narrowed the scope of the First National
Maintenance holding, the Court broadly applied the balancing test itself.
Despite the Court's rejection of a per se rule or presumption approach, the
Court came close to announcing a strong presumption against bargaining
in the partial closing areas by application of its own balancing test. More-
over, the Court reaffirmed previous court of appeals decisions'08 when it
97. Id at 2587, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 338. The dissent suggested that because management
already is required to bargain over the effects of a closing, a decision would not be unduly
delayed or publicized by bargaining over the closing itself. Id
98. Id
99. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
100. See Address by Professor William Gould, American Bar Association's Labor &
Management Law Meeting (August 10, 1981) (published in [8-11-81] 154 DAILY LAB. REP.
[BNA] D-1, D-5).
101. 101 S. Ct. at 2585, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 336.
102. Id at 2584 n.22, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 335 n.22. A negative attitude toward union involve-
ment in managerial decisionmaking permeates the Court's opinion. The attitude indicates a
departure from the Court's position in Fibreboard See id at 2579, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 329;
Gould, supra note 100, at D-2.
103. 101 S. Ct. at 2585, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 336.
104. Id
105. Gould, supra note 100, at D-5.
106. 101 S. Ct. at 2585, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 336.
107. Gould, supra note 100, at D-5.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 59-65.
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noted that the absence of significant investment or withdrawal of capital
was not crucial where the employer's decision to halt the work represented
a major change in the employer's operations. 109 After First National Main-
tenance the courts must determine to what extent, if any, the new balanc-
ing test will be applicable to management decisions other than partial
closings.
III. CONCLUSION
In First National Maintenance the Court confronted the question of
whether an employer must, under its duty to bargain in good faith "with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,"
negotiate with the certified representative of its employees over its decision
to close a part of its business. The Supreme Court resolved the confusion
of the courts of appeals and the National Labor Relations Board over the
question by announcing a balancing test regarding the duty to bargain
over fundamental business decisions. The Court held that section 8(d) of
the National Labor Relations Act does not obligate an employer to bar-
gain over management decisions having a substantial impact on the con-
tinued availability of employment, if the burden placed on the conduct of
the business outweighs the benefit for the collective bargaining process.
The Court, in effect, rejected the Board's per se approach that had ordered
management to bargain over both the effects and the decision in partial
closing situations. On the other hand, the Court did not accept the ap-
proach of the majority of appellate courts that a partial closing decision
based on economic concerns was an inherent management prerogative.
Rather, the Court applied its balancing test to determine that in this partial
closing situation the benefit to the union did not outweigh the burden im-
posed on management. Hence, the decision to partially close was not
within the scope of "terms and conditions" subject to mandatory bargain-
ing. The Court's opinion expressly stated that it offered no view as to other
types of management decisions. Although the Court criticized the uncer-
tainty facing employers and employees under the preexisting state of the
law, First National Maintenance, itself, may well result in a new uncer-
tainty as to whether management decisions other than partial closings will
be considered mandatory or permissive subjects of bargaining.
Shelley Hoffman
109. 101 S. Ct. at 2585, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 337.
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